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Abstract—This paper presents a study on how to improve a
distributed information collecting system in which information is
collected by a multi-agent system constituted by communicating
agents, assuming the hypothesis that some agents of this system
can deliberately (liar agents) or in good faith (defective agents)
produce or communicate incorrect information. To ensure the
coherence of the information system under these constraints, we
aim to gradually limit the impact of the incoming perturbations.
To reach this goal, we propose that each agent develops its
own communication strategy from a TrustSet it builds using
information collected by itself and information received from
agents it communicates with.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a distributed information collecting system in
the form of a multi-agents system (MAS). Each agent of
the system can search information, collect information items
and communicate. It collects information either directly or
indirectly via communication with other agents. We assume
that some agents disturb the system by disseminating false
or inaccurate information either because their perception is
flawed or because their interest goes against the community’s
one. In this article, the information to collect is assumed
invariable during the experimentation.
This article provides a methodology to deal with such a
perturbed distributed information collecting system. We study
ways to ensure the coherence of the system (i.e. adequation
between the agents’ environment representation and the real
environment) and its robustness (i.e. the agents’ capacity to
adopt strategies allowing to obtain this coherence despite the
disturbed communication system). To limit the influence of
agents transmitting incorrect information, we propose to use
the concepts of trust and reliability. TrustNet [1] appears to
be a promising way to allow each agent to build its own
evaluation of the other agents. One extension of the TrustNet
model, the TrustSet, is introduced in this article. It allows
keeping track of the information path. Agents start out with no
knowledge about the behavior of other agents. They improve
this knowledge by using direct and indirect interactions and
by considering the path followed by the information from
its source. While interacting, the model of trustworthiness
is refined and used to judge the reliability of information
in order to reject undesired communications. We show on a
simple mapping example in which a patrol of possibly flawed
robots maps a dangerous area that use of TrustSets can make
the system more robust against deceitful agents by improving
communication flow.
Section I introduces the problem. Trust and related works
are detailed in Section II. The TrustSet is presented in Section
III before describing how agents use TrustSets to define their
communication strategy in Section IV. Section V presents the
“danger mapping” application and its corresponding simula-
tion before showing the comparative results obtained using
different communication strategies. Finally Section VI presents
the future research.
II. TRUST
A. Why do we need trust ?
Communication is a source of enrichment and also pertur-
bation in an information collecting system where information
can be altered by unreliable agents. To limit the influence
of deceitful agents, we propose to work on communication
strategies in an attempt to eliminate both false information
and agents that are responsible for spreading false information
in the system. We give agents the ability to evaluate the
reliability of other agents and to choose the agents they want to
interact with. For this purpose, one of the most efficient tools
is the concept of trust: in this paper, trust is used in order to
identify and isolate unreliable agents. See [2] to understand
the importance of trust in agents’ theory.
Trust in MAS can be simply defined as the probability with
which an agent believes that another agent will enter in a
beneficial interaction with it. So in the sequel, trusts will have
values in [0, 1].
B. Related works
The model of trust by Marsh [3] takes into account only
direct information and experiences. In a more complete model,
ReGreT, by Sabater et al. [4], an agent computes its trust in
another agent using direct experiences and reputation. Up to
now, a lot of trust and reputation models have been published
[5]. Let us mention on line reputation models where the
reputation mechanism is based on ratings given by users after
a transaction. SPORAS [6] is an improved version of such
2models: only the most recent rating between two users is
considered. We can also refer to the model based on Dempster-
Shafer theory proposed by Yu and Singh [7] and to the Mui
et al.’s one using a Bayesian analysis [8]. In some models,
like Schillo et al.’s one [9], agents communicate not only
factual information but also trusts they have in other agents.
Our work is based on this model. Compared to the informa-
tion items collected by the distributed information collecting
system (data), all information about trust are considered as
metadata. Our agents as Schillo’s ones are able to exchange
data and metadata. Agents can thus build a network of trust
values called ‘TrustNet’. The final trust value of an agent
towards another one is an aggregate of direct experiences and
testimonies.
We have chosen this last model for two reasons. First, in
distributed information collecting systems, agents share all
their information, information they collect themselves and
information they receive from other agents. Second, as we
consider a system without centralized control or information
set, communication are only one-to-one. Thus a classic reputa-
tion system cannot be used. TrustNets provide a kind of local
and distributed reputation. Agents can compute trusts based on
direct experiences (which provide them a direct trust on other
agents) and on experiences between other agents (indirect
trust) not represented here by reputation but by information
carried by TrustNets.
III. TRUSTSETS
When agents use information from others agents, it is
important for them to know which agent is trustworthy and
which is not. For this purpose, we introduce a data structure
derived from the TrustNet that we call ’TrustSet’ which is
a pair of TrustGraph and TrustTable. The public part (the
TrustGraph) is a directed graph which contains both direct
trust and indirect trust, while the private part (the TrustTable)
is a simple table which contains the intrinsic trust (a trust value
estimated from direct and indirect trusts).
The main difference between Schillo’s model and ours is
on the data: agents in Schillo’s model transmit data related
to the trustfulness of an agent, whereas our agents transmit
information about the environment, from which agents have to
deduce trust. We thus present algorithms for computing trusts
from received information, but also algorithms for computing
the information reliability from the trust values, i.e. from the
TrustSet. Moreover in Schillo’s model, agents communicate
information about only one agent behaviors; in contrarily, we
propose that agents exchange their whole TrustGraph. We thus
have to propose methods to compute intrinsic trusts which are
contained in Trust Table, to merge TrustGraphs and to deal
with trust incoherence on shared paths.
A. State of the art on trust networks
Trust networks in MAS consist of transitive trust relation-
ships between connected agents. Trust can be derived by
analyzing the trust paths linking the agents together. Two op-
erators are required to build such trust networks: aggregation
to deal with trusts aiming the same object but coming from
different sources and propagation to compute trust along a
path. Several models have been developed according to the
methods used to implement these operators. In [10], first-
hand observations are exchanged between neighboring nodes
and merged only if neighbors’ opinions are close to its own
opinion. In EigenTrust by Kamvar et al. [11], in order to
aggregate local trust values, a node asks its neighbors for their
opinions about other peers. Neighbor’s opinions are weighted
by the trust the node places on them. [12], [13] propose similar
algorithms that evaluate trust by combining opinions from
selected groups. Some approaches work on local interaction
rules using algebraic graph theory such as [14].
B. TrustGraphs, TrustTables and TrustSets
Agents use TrustGraphs to compute their trust in other
agents. A TrustGraph is a directed graph which contains both
direct trusts and indirect trusts (received via communication).
Nodes represent agents. The root node is the owner of the
TrustGraph (A in Figure 1). Two nodes connected by an
arrow mean that agents have met each other. Edges carry
information about agents’ trust estimation. Values assigned
to arrows connecting the owner to other nodes represent the
owner’s trust value in agents it has already met. Each value
represents the direct trust of A in another agent (i.e. B in
Figure 1) computed by comparing data from A and B. It is
noted DTAB . Any arrow from B to C carries an indirect trust,
denoted ITBC , the trust of B in C communicated by B to
A. Each node is annotated with a value, the intrinsic trust,
denoted TAB, which represents the trust of A in B taking into
account both direct and indirect trusts. Intrinsic trust values
will be stored in a table called TrustTable.
A TrustGraph of agent X denoted as TGX =<
{NodeX}, {< ArcX , V alueX >} >and its TrustTable
TTX =< {< NodeX , V alueX >} > form a TrustSet
denoted as TSX = (TGX , TTX). The TrustGraph is built
thanks to collected or transmitted information. It represents
the public part of the TrustSet and will be communicated to
other agents. The TrustTable is computed thanks to algorithms
that can be specific to a particular agent; it thus represents the
private part of the TrustSet and will not be communicated to
other agents.
An example of TrustSet built by A is proposed in Figure 1:
it includes a TrustGraph formally represented by TGA =<
{A,B,C}, {< AB,DTAB >,< BC, ITBC >} > and
a TrustTable represented by TTA =< {< A, TAA >,<
B, TAB >,< C, TAC >} >. DTAB is the direct trust of
A in B, ITBC the trust of B in C communicated to A by B.
TAA is the intrinsic trust of A in itself, TAB the intrinsic trust
of A in B (calculated from the direct trust DTAB and from
all the indirect trusts ITXB associated to arcs leading to B).
A B CAB
DT BCIT
XBIT
AAT ABT ACT
Figure 1. Example of TrustSet
3C. TrustSet dynamics
1) Initializing TrustSet: Initially, each agent builds its own
TrustSet. The TrustGraph is initialized with the root node
and no arrow. The TrustTable contains one value, the trust
of the root agent in itself, initialized at 1 because it has no
reason to doubt on itself. Both TrustGraph and TrustTable will
then be updated thanks to information exchanged with other
agents. Note that we assume that each agent has an a priori
trust in other agents used as initial value for the first time it
communicates with another agent, that is noted in the sequel
Tinit.
2) Communicating TrustSet: Each time an agent A com-
municates with an agent B, it will eventually communicate to
B its data but also some of its metadata. In particular, it will
share its TrustGraph, which contains all public metadata, but
will not share its TrustTable because it is built by personal
calculation and thus contains private information. When an
agent receives a TrustGraph, it integrates it in its own one.
Then it uses the obtained TrustGraph to update its TrustTable.
3) Merging TrustGraphs: We consider an information ex-
change between agents A and B. We take the point of view
of A but the process is the same for B. The update of A’s
TrustGraph will be computed in 3 stages:
• A calculates its trust DTAB in B or updates the existing
value by comparing its own data with received ones;
• A connects B ’s TrustGraph to its own TrustGraph;
• A corrects every inconsistency in the shared paths.
a) Stage 1 - Computing direct trust by comparing in-
formation: To compute its trust in B, agent A compares its
own direct data DA with DB , the ones transmitted by B. The
computation follows 3 steps:
• A selects only the comparable data, which means data
about the same items. Their number is denoted β.
• A computes the incoherence level between DA and DB.
For this purpose, it uses a distance denoted δ, where
δ(x, y) represents the distance between the data x from
DA and y from DB . Intuitively, δ(x, y) = 0 means
that the two pieces of information are coherent (i.e. they
carry the same information on the same item), whereas
δ(x, y) > 0 represents the inconsistency degree between
both data. The incoherence level (denoted Inc level) is
computed following the formula:
Inc level =
∑
i∈{1,β} δ(xi, yi)
β ∗ δMaxinfo
with (xi, yi) each pair of comparable data and δMaxinfo
the largest distance between incoherent information.
• A threshold µ represents the maximum incoherence level
acceptable by an agent before decreasing its trust value
in another agent. If Inc level < µ , A will increase its
trust in B by a factor τ+; if Inc level > µ , A will
decrease its trust in B by a factor τ−; if Inc level = µ
, A lets its trust in B unchanged.
The value of τ+and τ− are computed depending on prop-
erties that designers want to give to the system. For this,
we introduce two thresholds: an upper threshold (Upp) and
a lower threshold (Low ). Between Upp and 1, agents are
regarded as “reliable”. Between Upp and Low , agents are
“under observation”. Between 0 and Low , agents are regarded
as “unreliable”. We also denote NI the estimated number
of interactions each agent needs to reach its objective and
ρstab the stabilization rate (ρstab ∈ [0, 1]), representing the
stage of the simulation after which designers consider the
classification of agents in reliable and unreliable sets to be
done. Thus ρstab ∗ NI represents the number of interactions
needed to pass from Tinit to Upp or Low (which means that
Tinit + NI ∗ ρstab ∗ τ
+ = Upp). We can thus express both
factors:
τ+ =
(Upp − Tinit )
ρstab ∗NI
and τ− = (Tinit − Low)
ρstab ∗NI
b) Stage 2 - Merging two TrustGraphs: Then A
builds an intermediate TrustGraph TGAB =< {Node∗}, {<
(Arc∗,Value∗) >} > from: TGA =< {NodeA}, {<
(ArcA,ValueA) >} > and TGB =< {NodeB}, {<
(ArcB ,ValueB ) >} >. The new nodes set consists of all the
nodes of both TrustGraphs: Node∗ = NodeA ∪ NodeB .
The new arrows set includes all the arrows from both sets
ArcA and ArcB . Moreover we add to this set the arrow
AB to link both TrustGraphs and we remove any arrow
coming back to A to avoid cycles. We thus have: Arc∗ =
{AB} ∪ ArcA ∪ ArcB \ {BA, ..., XA}. Albeit these arrows
are deleted, their associated trust values are taken into account
in the TrustTable update and influence the trust the agent has
in itself.
We associate the value DTAB to the arc between AB.
For each other arc, values of the arrows are taken from their
original TrustGraph.
c) Stage 3 - Managing trust incoherence on shared paths:
There is inconsistency on a shared arrow when an arrow
appears in both TrustGraphs with different values on it. This
case can typically appear when A and B meet C at two
different time points. To avoid this incoherence, a new value
of the incoherent trust value is computed as follows. Let XY
be an arrow common to TGA and TGB. XY carries the value
ITXYA in TGA and ITXYB in TGB .
• We build the sets PathA and PathB of all paths of
TGA and TGB including the arrow XY . To avoid cycle
problems, we choose only the shortest path.
• We compute the trust value ITXYAB of the common
arrow in the TrustGraph resulting from the merge of A’s
and B’s TrustGraph with the formula below:
ITXYAB =
∑
X∈PathA
TAX ∗ ITXYA +
∑
Y ∈PathB
TAY ∗ ITXYB
∑
X∈PathA
TAX +
∑
Y ∈PathB
TAY
This new trust value is the average of trusts on the shared
path balanced by the sum of trusts along all paths.
4) Updating the TrustTable: The intrinsic trusts must be
recalculated after the update of trusts in TrustGraphs if one
of the basic elements changes or if a new element enters into
its calculation. Two steps are required to calculate all intrinsic
trusts in the A’s TrustTable. First, we calculate intrinsic trusts
on all new nodes transmitted by B. Second, we calculate the
intrinsic trusts of all impacted nodes except nodes computed
4before.The intrinsic trust of A in an agent X is calculated by
this formula:
TAX =
TAA ∗DTAX +
∑
Y ∈AGENTS(TAY ∗ ITYX)
TAA +
∑
Y ∈AGENTS TAY
Note that TAX = DTAX when only one arc goes from A
to X and TAA is set to 1.
IV. HOW DO AGENTS USE THEIR TRUSTSET TO IMPROVE
THEIR PERFORMANCE AND THE SYSTEM ROBUSTNESS ?
A. Impact of trusts on communication
According to the results obtained in their TrustTable, agents
modify their communication strategy. The main idea is to
separate agents more precisely at each step by separating
untrusted agents (with which it has already been proved
useless or harmful to communicate) from other agents (those
who could yet provide useful information - under observation
and reliable ones). An agent decides to stop communicating
(partially or totally) with another agent as soon as the trust
value computed for this agent falls under the Low threshold.
This way, bad information ceases to flood the information
network and gradually disappears due to the information
reliability computation mode described in the next section.
B. Computing the information reliability
Via communication, agents receive conflicting information.
Agents have thus to determine which ones are reliable and
which are not. In order to calculate the information reliability,
each agent uses a probability tree to represent one information
item in its memory. Each value or each range of values for
one information item is associated to a node of the tree. The
pair (θ, {Ai...Am}) is associated to each edge, where θ is
the probability for the information to be true (its reliability)
and {Ai...Am} the information sources. Each time a new data
comes, the agent updates these values in the tree. A major issue
for an agent is to determine the reliability of one information
item when several groups of agents give different information
on the same item. It needs to compare the relative weights of
these groups. For this purpose, a TrustWeight TW is assigned
to each group depending on individual trusts as follows.
First, the TrustWeight of each group is evaluated by split-
ting the group in three sets (reliable, unreliable and others)
according to the Upp and Low thresholds defined above. A
weight is assigned to each agents community: α for reliable
agents, γ for unreliable agents, β for other agents. Then, the
balanced sum of the cardinals of these sets is computed. By
setting appropriate values for α, β and γ, this method aims
at creating an equilibrium between the quality of agents in a
group and their quantity. If we note pi each data associated to
an information item p brought by a group Gi of {G, ..., Gn},
the set of groups having transmitted different data for the
same item p , the agent computes the reliability of each data
pi as follows before choosing the data that has the maximal
reliability:
reliability (pi) =
TW (Gi)∑
k∈[1,n] TW (Gk)
For the agent, the chosen data is the value of the item at
this instant and the associated reliability the item reliability.
V. AN EXAMPLE: DANGER MAPPING
A. Description
One of the main examples we have chosen to test the effi-
ciency of TrustSets to improve the detection of deceitful agents
in a distributed information collecting system, that we will
refer to as ‘Danger Mapping’ in the sequel, figures a swarm
of localized mobile robots patrolling in an unknown land. The
objective of each robot is to build the most complete, precise
and reliable map of the land using least resources as possible.
In particular, their job consists in detecting dangerous spots
and evaluating their dangerousness degree. Robots can detect
directly the state of a nearby zone thanks to their sensors.
They can also communicate with other robots to exchange
knowledge about the land. We assume that each robot has
limited perception and communication ranges. Among the
robots, some can collect and transmit false information due
to flawed sensors.
B. Modeling and Simulation
The land with its danger zones is figured by a 75 x 75
grid. The space is toroidal - meaning that if robots (figured
by agents) move off one edge of the grid, they appear on the
opposite edge. An integer value is randomly given to each
patch of the grid, from 0 to n, figuring the danger level of
the zone. Agents can collect data in their perception range,
communicate in their communication range, update their data
and metadata bases and move. Unreliable agents are defined as
agents unable to detect the correct danger level of a zone, as if
the spectrum of their sensors was shifted out. The simulation
can stop either when one agent knows the whole map or all
the reliable agents know the map, as the user chooses.
1) The Goals: A danger mapping simulator1 has been
developed in order to investigate the possibilities to improve
the coherence and robustness of an information collecting
system based on robots, some of them deceitful ones. The
key questions addressed are :
• What is the effect of unreliable robots on the community?
• How can deceitful robots be detected?
• What are the compared performances of the system when
robots use several strategies:
– robots do not communicate
– robots communicate only data
– robots communicate data and ReputationTables2 .
– robots communicate data and TrustGraphs but keep
private TrustTables.
• How robust is the system to deceitful robots?
1Our mapping simulation is written in the simulation platform GAMA[15].
2In this strategy, a simple reputation table is used to store trust value on
others agents. These values are computed as follows: when agent A meets
agent B, firstly it calculates its trust on B (DTAB) as in stage 1 of the
TrustGraphs merging process. Then A updates its own trust values in all the
agents met by B (AgtsB ) via the formula:
TAX =
T old
AX
∗ TAA +DTAB ∗ TBX
TAA +DTAB
with X ∈ AgtsB and T oldAX represents the old A’ trust on X .
52) Parameters: The simulation parameters are sorted into
three categories: * Environment: we can fix the size of the grid,
the number of reliable agents, the number of unreliable agents
and the number of dangerous places; * Agent: we can choose
the perception range of the agents, their communication range
and one among four representative communication strategies;
* Trust: here we fix the reliability/unreliability thresholds for
the agents (and information), the stabilization rate (default:
0.5), the level of contradictory information (default: 0.05).
3) Evolution of the simulation:
1) Initialization : A number of agents, some reliable, some
unreliable, are randomly created.
2) Main loop : Each agent executes the following actions
in sequence until the end of the simulation.
a) Collect accessible land data in the perception do-
main
b) Communicate with reliable or under observation
agents (as estimated at the current step) in the
communication domain
c) Update data bases (land data bases & metadata
bases - Trust Sets) each time a new information
is added
d) Move
3) End : The simulation can stop either when one agent
knows the total map or when all the reliable agents know
the map, as the user chooses.
4) Results: On the 75 x 75 grid, we create 65 dangerous
zones and 20 agents with appropriate ranges so that agents
can meet a sufficient number of different agents along the
experimentation to build significant TrustSets. To test the
performance of the proposed approach, we tested the influence
of different parameters and different strategies of communi-
cation: (A) no communication, (B) communication without
trust support, (C) communication with Reputation Table, (D)
communication with TrustSets.
a) Computation of the reliability threshold: We have
conducted some experiments with communication strategies
(C) and (D) that show that if the reliability threshold is greater
than 0.6, the distance between the map obtained by the agents
and the real map is equal to zero. For instance if the chosen
threshold is 0.55, the average number of erroneous danger
zones kept by the reliable agents at the end of the simulation
is 6.6 for strategy (C) and 0.1 for strategy (D). We thus use
the value of 0.6 for the reliability threshold all along the
experimentations.
b) Performances of the system vs. 4 communication
strategies: Figure 2 shows the exploration time (simulation
steps) necessary for the reliable agents to get a map identical to
the real map (where all dangerous places are correctly situated
and evaluated) with the four communication strategies above
depending on the ratio of unreliable agents.
We note that when the proportion of unreliable agents in a
system is smaller than 0.7, using the TrustSet strategy to detect
deceitful agents is more effective than other strategies, i.e. the
time in order that all the agents in the system get the real map
is the best one due to benefits acquired from communication
with other reliable agents. This result seems logical : the larger
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Figure 2. Number of steps to get a real map with 4 communication strategies
the number of reliable agents in the system, the higher the
number of useful communication. On the other side, when the
system counts many untrustful agents, the performances of the
four communication strategies are identical because most of
the information received are not reliable, so that agents must
verify themselves the whole map. This number of 0.7 is the
robustness limit of the system. This number is very interesting
because it describes the proportion of unreliable agents a
system can bear, in other words, its robustness. With a greater
value, it is better for reliable agents not to communicate. We
intend to show this point in a later publication by using the
percolation theory [16] in a complex system approach of this
problem.
Figure 3 illustrates the average time necessary for all reliable
agents to detect correctly the map under all communication
strategies. To get this result, we ran a great number of
simulations for which the number of deceitful agents ranged
from 1 to 15 with a total number of agents fixed. It shows
that we can use the TrustSet policy to get good performances
as long as we are under the system limit of 0.7. And more
generally, when agents have no idea about the deceitful agents
proportion, it shows that the best communication strategy is
the communication with TrustSets.
Figure 3. Average number of steps (by varying unreliable agents from 1 to
15 among 20 agents) to get a real map with 4 communication strategies
c) A basic communication strategy: The TrustSet strat-
egy was also introduced to impact the communication system.
As we said in Section V-A, when an agent knows that
other agents send bad information, why would it persist in
communicating with them ? It is better for this agent to stop
communicating with this kind of agents as soon as it is certain
that they are unreliable. The strategy adopted by agents in our
simulation is as follows:
61) when an agent A meets an agent B, it can send infor-
mation (its trust in B is above the Low threshold) or not (its
trust in B is below the Low threshold)
2) it can receive information (B’s trust in A is above Low
) or not (B’s trust in A is below Low )
3) it can consider the received information (its trust in B is
above Low ) or not (its trust in B below Low ).
To demonstrate the benefits of such a communication strat-
egy, we computed the number of meetings, the number of
sent, received and handled messages. It is obvious that this
basic communication strategy has an impact on the volume
of communication. In Figure 4, we compare the number of
meetings (which is also the number of communication when
agents do not use trust) and the number of sent messages
without impairing the performance of the system. We note
that the volume of communications is much reduced (about
900 information exchanges for 1600 meetings). As it can be
seen in Figure 4, agents reject communication from untrustful
agents since the simulation step number 150. This number
can change according to the value the user chooses at the
beginning of the simulation for the stabilization rate. The lesser
this value, the sooner the deceitful agents are dismissed from
the communication system but the greater the possibility of
mistakes.
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Figure 4. Comparison between the number of sent messages (red) and the
number of meetings (blue)
All these results significantly confirm our choices. In par-
ticular, we show the circumstances (proportion of untrustful
agents in a MAS) and limits (robustness of the system) under
which a communication policy based on TrustSets can improve
the comportment of a community made up of reliable and
unreliable members. We show under these conditions that a
TrustSet strategy gives better results than a ReputationTable
strategy.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper addresses the problem of disturbed communities
where information collection is altered by unreliable members.
By associating a reliability to information and a trust to mem-
bers of the community, each member improves its perception
of the world. Considering that agents can work on direct (col-
lected from the environment) and indirect (received from other
agents) information, keeping this duality not only in stored, but
also in transmitted data, gives to agents the ability to build and
update better tuned information for data and more accurate
TrustSets for metadata. It is one of the originalities of our
approach. Actually, the computing of one agent’s confidence
in another agent takes into account at the same time the quality
of the metadata transmitted by the other agent and the distance
between the data gathered by both agents. This strategy finally
helps an agent to enforce its communication with trusted
agents and to reject communication from untrusted ones. The
extension of the notion of TrustGraph to TrustSet, in which we
distinguish public and private values, and the new developed
fusion algorithms between TrustSets allow us to get better
results on time than traditional ReputationTable strategies.
So we show that sometimes in a perturbed community, it
is better not to give all the information we get to other
members when these members are perhaps not reliable. Our
future work will focus on the community self-organization
about communication management, on the structuring of sub
communities according to their reliability and on the limits
of perturbation a disturbed system can support by using a
complex system approach.
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